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CASE COMMENTS
COPYIRIGHTS-DIsTRiBuTioN or CorEs OF SPEECH To NEWs
MEDIA HELD

To BE LimITED

PuBmcATION

Plaintiff gave a speech before 200,000 people in Washington, D.C. as
part of an organized civil rights "march." He had previously given a copy
of the speech to the "press liaison personnel" of the march committee, who
in turn mimeographed and distributed copies exclusively to the press. One
New York newspaper printed the complete text and later offered reprints
for sale. Plaintiff's delivery of the speech was broadcast over radio and
television and recorded for newsreels. Defendants later began independently to sell phonograph records of plaintiff delivering his speech. Plaintiff
instituted suit for copyright infringement immediately after registering
with the Copyright Office 1 his claim to the copyright of a work "not reproduced for sale." 2 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted a preliminary injunction, holding that the delivery of

the speech and the distribution of copies to the press constituted only a
"limited publication," so that plaintiff could still obtain federal copyright
protection. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)

.3

Copyrightable works are protected by the dual operation of common
law 4 and the federal Copyright Act. 5 Common law affords protection
until "publication," at which time an author is said to have "dedicated"
his work to the public. 6 Under the Copyright Act protection of previously
unpublished works may be secured for a limited time either by publication
117 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
2 During these proceedings he published his speech in printed form with notice
of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958). Even though the relief requested is a
preliminary injunction, events subsequent to the commencement of suit are immaterial.
Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 655 (1938).
3 This case has been noted in 50 VA. L. REv. 939 (1964) ; 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
1148 (1964).
4 Common-law protection is defined as the exclusive right both to first publication
and to authorization of use prior to first publication. See, e.g., Harper & Bros. v.
See generally BALL,
M. A. Donohue & Co., 144 Fed. 491, 492 (C.C.N.D. I1. 1905).
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY

§ 216 (1944).

G17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958).
6 See, e.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957 (1952) ; Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Becket, 9 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y
(pts. 1-2), 102, 122, 194, 200-02 (1962). See also National Comics Publications,
Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1951).
(607)
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with proper notice of copyright 7 or, in the case of certain works including
speeches, by registration with the Register of Copyrights as a work "not
reproduced for sale." 8 The concept of "publication" represents the critical
dividing line between works which are protected by common law or capable
of protection under the federal act and those which have fallen into the
public domain.
In administering this concept the determination must be made whether
federal or state law defines its scope. Proof that a work was already in
the public domain when the claim to federal copyright was first made
constitutes a valid defense to an assertion of copyright infringement. 9
Therefore, the federal scheme of protection may be frustrated if a state is

free to restrict or expand its definition of "publication." Not only would
difficult conflict of laws problems result,10 but the federal statutory timelimitation for protection could be abridged or enlarged." For these reasons
the supremacy clause of the Constitution would seem to demand a uniform
2
federal standard of publication in applying the Copyright Act.'
Federal copyright protection is limited by the Constitution to "writings." '3 While the written words of a speech, for example, are protected,
a performance which has not been reduced to tangible form is not copyrightable and is protected only insofar as the protection of the written words
requires prohibiting reproduction of the performance. 14
7 See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) ; 17 U.S.C.
§ 8 (Supp. V, 1964) ; 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19 (1958) ; 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1958), as amended,
17 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. V, 1964).
8
17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 8 (Supp. V, 1964).
10See Sargoy, An Exclusive Federal Statutory System for Literary and Artistic
Works: The Confusions in the Diversity of Our Present Federal and State Systems,
8 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 6 (1961); cf. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) ; Warner, Multistate
Publication in Radio and Television, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 14, 29-31 (1958).
"1See Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1079, 1094-96 (1959).
12 The grant to the federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction over any "civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights," 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1958), seems to require that they formulate the standard. Any difference between
state and federal standards has generally been ignored by assuming that the same
"principle" governs both. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958), affirming and modifying 151 F. Supp. 28,
39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (reference to both state and federal law) ; White v. Kimmell,
193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952). But see Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 659 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; id. at
667 (L. Hand, J., dissenting). For a discussion of whether there should be a difference
in the standards, see Elman, The Limits of State Jurisdiction in Affording Common
Law Protection to Clothing Designs, 11 VArN. L. REv. 501, 510-13 (1958) ;-Kalodner &
Vance, supra note 11, at 1092-96; Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright:. The
Capitol Records Case, 69 HA.v. L. REV. 409 (1956) ; cf. Whicher, supra note 6, at
203-14 (exegesis of Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)). Compare
S. 3008, H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (1964) ("preemption with respect to
other laws").
'3 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally NImmER, CoPYRIGHT § 8 (1963);
Note, Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1263 (1956).
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (a)-(b) (1958).
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The rule is also established that the performance of a work, such as a
play or lecture, is not a divestitive publication.' 5 Thus the mere delivery
of the speech in the present case, even in such public surroundings, did not
by itself divest plaintiff's common law rights.16 A speaker's use of mechanical devices to extend the range of his audience, such as a radio microphone
or a film, similarly is not a publication, for no tangible form has been
given to the public. 17 However, if a speaker himself distributes films and
recordings of his speech, that distribution might be considered a publication because of the intent to put the speech into the public domain.' s In
the present case, although plaintiff did not actually distribute films and
recordings, the public's ability to make them during the speech raises
the possibility that plaintiff could be deemed to have given his implicit
consent. It can be contended that plaintiff was actually courting publicity
since the presence of newsreel cameras and other recording devices was
anticipated, and probably even encouraged. However, under the circumstances, there was no way in which plaintiff could have restricted the
making of records, short of refusing to speak. Furthermore, since delivery
alone does not constitute a publication,' 9 it should not amount to a consent
which would have the same effect. Thus, absent a showing of actual
encouragement, the films and recordings should not be held a dedicatory
publication.
15 Ferris v. Frobman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (play); Nutt v. National Institute
Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929) (lecture). See
generally Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 CALrF. L. REv. 40 (1954). Compare id. at 41, with Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent Trends in the Law of Artistic
Property, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 323, 341-42 (1957).
16 Nutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, supra note 15;
Bartlett v. Crittendon, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (No. 1076) (C.C. Ohio 1849).
17 Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 655 (1938) (film); Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp.
358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified and aff'd, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 670 (1936) (radio broadcast of dialogue script) ; Mills Music Co. v. Cromwell
Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (radio broadcast of musical composition); Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931) (film).
18 Compare Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949) (publication
based on interpretation of California statute), with Brandon Films, Inc. v. Arjay
Enterprises, Inc., 33 Misc. 2d 794, 230 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (no publication
without unrestricted distribution). The distribution of phonograph records presents
a similar problem which is equally lacking in judicial resolution, although a few
decisions have indicated that such a distribution should be a publication. E.g., Mills
Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (SD.N.Y. 1954) (dictum);
Shapiro Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950) (dictum). But cf. Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1947)
(distribution of records of composition registered under what is now § 12 is not a
forfeiture). See generally Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of
Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469 (1955).
The inability to copyright a phonograph record, 37 C.F.R. §202.8(b) (1964),
constitutes a possible objection to deeming its distribution a publication. See
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907). Compare
Katz, The Publication of Intellectual Productions-A Common Sense Approach, 30
So. CAL. L. REV. 48, 52 (1956), with Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLUM. L.
Rxv. 185, 189-92 (1956). However, since films are explicitly copyrightable, 17 U.S.C.
§ 5(l) - (m) (1958), and may be registered, 37 C.F.R. § 202.15 (1960), no similar
objections could be made to holding the distribution of films to be a publication.
19 Nutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236
(2d Cir. 1929) ; Bartlett v. Crittendon, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (No. 1076) (C.C. Ohio 1849).
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The question then arises whether the distribution of mimeographed
copies constitutes a publication. The attempt to define the amorphous
concept of publication 2o has resulted in a distinction between a "general
publication," and one which is "limited." A general publication dedicates
the work to the public and is a result of the author's permitting an un21
restricted distribution of copies of the work without notice of copyright.
On the other hand, the publication might be only "limited" and not
dedicatory if the distribution of copies is confined to a restricted group
for a restricted purpose.2
The present distribution, even though "limited" to the press, seemingly
reflected an intention to disseminate plaintiff's work as widely and rapidly
23
as possible, rather than to limit it to a specific group for a limited purpose.
Furthermore, the distribution fulfilled the tangibility requirement. It
might be argued that plaintiff was merely helping to keep the public informed, and that no inference of an intention to dedicate need be made
from expediting a newspaper's "fair use" of plaintiff's speech? 4 But the
judicially created "fair use" exception only permits a newspaper to excerpt
from or summarize a copyrighted work.25 The distribution of copies of the
entire text without any explicit restriction on use, even if made only to the
20 See Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
In American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 126 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), two appeals
were taken before all questions of publication were resolved. See 239 F.2d 740 (1956);
219 F.2d 223 (1955).
21 See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1960), vacated and remanded for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816
(1958) ; White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952);
NimmER, COPYRIGHT § 49 (1963).
22 See Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904);
Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Schellberg v. Empringham,
36 F.2d 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); cf. Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). See generally NimmERl, COPYRIGHT § 58 (1963).
23 See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907).
24 Compare Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556, 559 (D.
Mass. 1928), wuith Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 273
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded for insufficient record,
369 U.S. 111 (1962).
25 See Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.
N.Y. 1940); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in ASCAP, SIXTH CopyRIGHT LAw SYmPOSiUm 43 (1955); Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE FOR SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEmARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS,
SENATE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,

No. 14, at 5-18 (Comm. Print 1960). But see McDonald, Non-Infringing
Uses, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 466 (1962). "Fair use" is usually a defense to an

STUDY

infringement claim. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938). But see Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover,

284 F.2d 262, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111
(1962) (dictum).

But "fair use" may be inapplicable since in the past it has been only applied to
statutory copyrights. See Latman, supra at 7; Warner, Protection of the Content
of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REV. 209,
222 (1950). But see Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 271

(D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962)

(dictum).
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press,2 6 should be a general publication. 27 The unwarranted inference of an
intention to restrict use gives the plaintiff, in effect, the same protection as
if he had secured a statutory copyright, but spares him from the time
limitation that the statute imposes.
Even if there were no dedicatory publication in the present case, the
sequence of events would have posed a question of the scope of federal
protection if litigation had proceeded past the preliminary stages. Since
only about two days elapsed between the registration of plaintiff's claim to
copyright and the filing of his complaint, it can be argued that federal statutory standards 28 for copyright infringement would determine the damages
incurred only for the two day period, leaving state common law to determine the rest.29 On the other hand, the act could be interpreted as applying retroactively, thus allowing the federal standard to determine all damages. While no court apparently has been faced with this issue and while
in most cases the possible state claim could be handled by a federal court
as pendent to the federal claim, 30 the differences in damages could be
significant. The federal act provides a schedule of damages for certain
infringements 3 1 which is different from the common-law measures of damages, 32 thus creating a possible disparity depending on the applicable law.
The analysis thus far has concentrated upon protection of the words
of plaintiff's speech. Even if the distribution of mimeographed copies constituted a publication foreclosing protection of the words under the Copyright Act, state law might still offer a remedy for the misappropriation of
plaintiff's personal rendition of the speech 33 Two recent Supreme Court
cases indirectly raise the question whether federal protection of the written
element of the speech preempts state protection of the individual's delivery. 34 Under the federal act a copyright proprietor may prohibit an
28

6Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556 (D.Mass. 1928).

27 See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957

(1952) ; Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962), which have been classified as
involving "conditional disclosures, where no steps were taken to enforce the condition."
Note, Publication and the Copyright Law Revision, 50 CAIF. L. REv. 672, 673 n.13
(1962). Compare Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (insurance forms distributed to insurance firms as
prospective customers).
17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1958). See generally NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 151-54
(1963); Strauss, The Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, in U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE FOR SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE CoMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVi ISOI, Study No. 22,

at 1-2
2 (Comm. Print 1956).
9In O'Neill v. General Film Co., 171 App. Div. 854, 869, 157 N.Y. Supp. 1028,
1040 (1916), a state court assessed damages for a period before a claim to federal
copyright had been made and left any further relief to a federal court.

30 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958).
31

See 17 U.S.C. §§1I(c), 101 (b), (e) (1958).

32 See NimmER, COPYRIGHT § 150 (1963).
3 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955).
34 In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and Sears,

Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), the Court held that state law may
not forbid the copying of an article unpatentable because of insufficient inventiveness.
See generally Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 CoLum.
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unauthorized recording or delivery of his speech,3 5 as well as any sale of
printed copies 3 6 If either expiration of the copyright term or a publication
without notice of copyright leaves the speech unprotected by the Copyright
Act, state law may not afford similar protection that would defeat the
Copyright Act's aim of permitting public access to dedicated, copyrightable
works. 7 However, a rendition itself is uncopyrightable,. 8 and state protection of the original rendition, as a property right in a distinctive performance,3 9 would not seem to interfere with public access to the written
words which, through the mimeographed copies, remain in the public
domain.
The applicable doctrine in New York 4 is that of unfair competition.
This doctrine has been used to prohibit the "palming off" of one's product
as another's to take advantage of public confusion 41 and more recently
has been used to prohibit the tortious appropriation of another's intangible
"property" right in a performance. 2 Such property rights are founded on
L. Rxv. 1178 (1964). The language used in Compco would seem to extend this
principle to literary works. 376 U.S. at 237. As extended, it would certainly seem to
overrule a case such as Frank M. Shaw, Inc. v. C. H. Cleworth & Associates, Inc.,
110 U.S.P.Q. 394 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (whether or not an advertising brochure was
in the public domain was immaterial to the issue of protection). In determining the
extent of this preemptive effect, consideration should be given to 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958),
which reserves prepublication protection to the states, and to the fact that the Copyright Act does not protect all intellectual works. See Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
For the differing judicial interpretations of the implications of Stiffel and Compco,
compare Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 n.4 (2d Cir.
1964), with Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
3
365 See 17 U.S.C. §§1(c), 101(a) (1958).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 101(a) (1958).
37 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (dictum) ; Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) (dictum); cf. Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (dictum). But see comment by Professor
Bender in Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1179,
1228, 1236 (1964).
33
See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
39
E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955).4 0
Assuming a proper complaint, the instant court's jurisdiction could be either
pendent to that of the copyright claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958) ; see River Brand
Rice Mills, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1964), petition
for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. W=zx 3157 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1964) (No. 555), or based on
diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958). The court must apply the law applicable in
New York courts. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity
Shop,41 Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
See, e.g., Mercury Record Corp. v. Buckingham Record Co., 226 F. Supp. 427
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); United Artists Records, Inc. v. Theatre Prods. Records, Inc.,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) in 151 N.Y.L.J., April 13, 1964, p. 14, col. 3. See generally
Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HAgv. L. REv. 1289 (1940) ; Stern & Hoffman, Public
Injury and the Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. Ray. 935 (1962); Note, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 544 (1964).
Compare F.T.C. Regulations for Phonograph Record Industry, 4 TRADE REG. REP.
41067, at § 67.27 (1964) (misbranding, misrepresentation, and deceptive selling
methods).
42 See, e.g., Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct), aff'd
mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951) ; Whicher, supra note 6, at 219-23.
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the commercial value of an original creation, a value which can be sustained
by legal protection. 3 For example, a world's fair 4 or athletic contests
held in a famous arena 45 have an economic value arising from the ability
to exclude the public from seeing the attraction. Once an athletic or
artistic performance has been recorded, the full commercial value to the
performer can be maintained only by his controlling reproduction and
forbidding others to trade on his reputation. 46 The gravamen, then, of
unfair competition or misappropriation is the injury to the performer's
48
marketing efforts, 47 even if only potential.
See generally Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11
VAND L. R1Ev. 483 (1958) ; Note, Developments in the Laz--Competitive Torts, 77
H.Av. L. REv. 888, 935 (1964). Furthermore, the "right to privacy," see N.Y. CIVii
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52, may in some cases be an inseparable component of the "property"

right in a performance. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155
N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 203 (1954).

But cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962). However, if the right to privacy has been waived, as
it may well have been in the instant case, or has not been violated, recovery must be
limited to the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 492-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956);
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) ; Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent Trends in the Law of Artistic Property, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 323,

337 (1957).

43 Note, Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888,
936-42
(1964).
44
New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc., 21
App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964).
45 Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459,
7 N.Y.S.2d
845 (1938).
46
See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.
N.C. 1939); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S2d 171
(Sup. Ct. 1956) ; Metropolitan Opera Association v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107

N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).

47 See cases cited note 46 supra.
48 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42
Misc. 2d 809, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (citing instant case); Karr v. Leeds
Music Corp., 126 U.S.P.Q. 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Whicher, supra note 6, at 221-23.
In the present case New York courts might find that, since any injury sustained
occurred in New York, Washington, D.C. law would be immaterial to the question
of misappropriation. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F2d
657 (1955) ; Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956). See generally KAPLAx & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 611-14 (1960).
However, recovery under misappropriation law implies the
existence of a property right in the work. With a few exceptions, see RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940) (overruled by
Capitol Records, supra); New York World's Fair 1964-65 Corp, v. Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251
N.Y.S2d 885 (1964) (dictum); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28 (1960) ; S.C. CODE § 66-101
(1962), instances of state-defined dedications of noncopyrightable works are rare;
and even though there are apparently no relevant decisions, it may be assumed that
Washington, D.C. would recognize, absent statute, property right in a rendition in
accord with neighboring jurisdictions. Cf. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., supra. But Whether or not Washington lawv recognizes this property right, New
York courts might find New York's interest controlling. Cf. Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). Compare Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304
N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952), with Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129
F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
945 (1956).
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In the present case, even though defendants' New York sales were undoubtedly aided by plaintiff's reputation 49 and would probably tend to
diminish the market value of plaintiff's performance,50 the context of the
speech should be considered. Plaintiff held himself out more as a demonstrator with a message for all than as a performer with an act. 51 Given
the lack of restrictions on the audience and the intended newsworthiness
of the event, there was no warning that a property right in plaintiff's contribution to the demonstration would later be claimed. If, as a result, no
property right is recognized, it follows that there could be no injurious
52
appropriation.
However, even if New York would recognize a property right in the
delivery, any rights therein were also divested under federal copyright, if
the making of newsreels with plaintiff's consent constituted a dedicatory
publication.m Since in publishing the newsreels both the rendition and the
words of the speech would appear to have been dedicated,-" federal preemption should foreclose the possibility of any additional state protection. 55

MARITIME LAW-A STEVEDORE'S NEGLIGENT USE OF SEAWORTHY SHIP'S EQUIPMENT CREATES U1NSEAWORTHINESS

Libelant longshoremen were unloading cargo in the hold of libelee's
ship. Although a ship's officer warned them against making large sling
loads, a group of longshoremen, including two of the libelants, began to
remove plywood sheets from the hold by placing two large piles of sheets
side by side in the same sling and hoisting them. The load buckled and
fell apart, inflicting serious injuries on the three libelant longshoremen.
The sling itself was in good condition, the accident being caused solely
49 The cover of one record jacket had a picture of the crowd, the title "Freedom
March on Washington August 28, 1963," and a statement that the record was taken
from a newsreel made of the speeches given that day, including the plaintiff's.
5o See note 49 .rtpra. Plaintiff was marketing records of an earlier, similar
speech. Instant case at 104. He was also arranging to market records of his
Washington speech. Instant case at 108.
51 Defendant made a similar argument as to the issue of publication. See Brief
for Defendant, 20th Century-Fox Record Corp., p. 26. Rejection of that argument
in deciding the federal issue is by no means controlling as to the issue of state
protection of the performance (an issue not reached in the instant case).
52 Cf. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup.
Ct. 1959), rev'd per curiam, 11 App. Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, amended, 13 App.
Div. 2d 473, 214 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1960), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
53 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
54 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952). But ef.
Kalodner & Vance, .supranote 11, at 1124. See generally Kupferman, Rights in New
Media, 19 LAW & CONTFmP. PROB. 172 (1954).
5 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (dictum);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (dictum). Compare Elman,
The Limits of State Jurisdictionin Affording Common Law Protection to Clothing
Designs, 11 VAND. L. Rxv. 501, 509-11 (1958), with Kalodner & Vance, supra note 11,
at 1125.
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by the longshoremen's act of lifting two stacks of plywood side by side.
Although the district court dismissed the libel, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a stevedore's negligence in using
a ship's admittedly seaworthy equipment renders the ship unseaworthy as a
matter of law.' Ferrantev. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 85 Sup. Ct. 10 (1964).
In a companion case plaintiff longshoreman, one of a gang loading
steel from railroad cars onto defendant's ship, was stationed at the brake
of a car to stop it at the loading point. Other longshoremen attached a
line from the ship's winch to three other cars (behind plaintiff's) which
were then drawn forward to bump plaintiff's car into position. The impact
was so violent that plaintiff was thrown from the car and was injured when
he fell beneath the wheels. Judgment was entered for plaintiff on a jury
finding that this dangerous method of moving the cars rendered the ship
unseaworthy, although there was no evidence of the winch or line being
defective. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Thompson
v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct.
259 (1964).
Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, a shipowner is bound to provide a ship, equipment, and crew which are reasonably fit for their intended
service 2 Breach of this duty creates absolute liability, imposed regardless
of the shipowner's diligence.3 The unseaworthy condition may be temporary or permanent, 4 and liability may exist if the plaintiff himself negligently created the hazard 5 This doctrine has been extended to protect
longshoremen, 6 even in cases where the defective equipment is brought
aboard by the stevedore company. 7 It extends to men injured on the pier,"
I The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying a similar theory, recently
held that the use of oversize sling loads may constitute unseaworthiness when such
use had continued for almost three hours. Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336
F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964). The court there held that this might constitute a "course
of conduct" sufficient to create a dangerous condition, but explicitly distinguished
the situation from an isolated act of negligence. Id. at 370. Under facts similar to
Ferrante, the Second Circuit found no unseaworthiness. Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S.
Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). In a more recent
decision, the Second Circuit distinguished the Ferrante and Thompson cases on
grounds which suggest that court's reluctance to follow these cases. Guarracino v.
S.S. Co., 333 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1964).
Luckenbach
2
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) ; see Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946).
3 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 548-50 (1960).
Thus the fact
that in the Ferrante case a ship's officer warned the longshoreman not to overload
the sling is irrelevant to the question of unseaworthiness.
4

Ibid.

5 Although contributory negligence is no defense in an action for unseaworthiness,
it may be considered in mitigation of damages. Ktistakis v. United Cross Nay. Corp.,
316 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 915 (1964); Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 n.l1 (1946) (dictum); Grillea v. United States, 232
F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum).
6 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
7 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirming mem. 205 F.2d
478 8(9th Cir. 1953).
Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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as well as aboard ship, and recovery has been allowed for injuries resulting
from attacks by deranged crew members, 9 improperly stowed cargo,10
defective cargo containers," and dangerous configurations created when the
stevedore removes cargo from the stowage, leaving other cargo, originally
12
safe, in a precarious position.
The present cases mark a major expansion of the unseaworthiness
doctrine. By allowing recovery to longshoremen injured by the negligent
use of ship's equipment concededly fit for its intended use, these cases
seem to extend the limits of the doctrine to include all negligent use of
equipment '" and, despite clear statements by the Supreme Court to the
contrary, seem tantamount to requiring the shipowner to maintain an
accident-free ship.' 4 This shifts the focus of judicial inquiry from whether
the ship or its appurtenances were defective to a consideration of the longshoreman's behavior, quite apart from the fitness of the equipment involved.
Instead of granting recovery on libelant's contention that the longshoremen, in making the sling load, constructed a defective piece of equipment,' 5
9 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
'o Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960).
"1 Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) ; see Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963).
12 Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Knox v. United States
Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F.
Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960); Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193

(S.D.N.Y. 1960).

13 The Ferrante case certainly goes that far, and perhaps even farther, since the
court states: "[T]he fact remains that the stevedore 'failed to perform safely, a basis
for liability including negligent and nonnegligent conduct alike,' and that made the
ship unseaworthy." Ferrante, 331 F.2d at 578. This language suggests that the
court may intend to extend the doctrine not merely to negligent use of equipment,
but to all use of equipment. Such a result is consistent with the general rule that
unseaworthiness is entirely divorced from negligence concepts. Cf. Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
The court's use of language from Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazioni v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964), does little to strengthen the opinion
since that case had nothing to do with "the basis for the
injured longshoreman's
recovery against the ship," Ferrante, 331 F.2d at 577 n.1 6 , but dealt entirely with
the shipowner's indemnification for breach of the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike service.
14The doctrine already encompasses injuries caused by defective equipment, and
Ferrante extends it to those caused by negligent use of fit gear. Probably very few
longshoreman injuries cannot be placed in one or the other of these categories. This
may not be consistent with Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960),
where the Supreme Court said: "[This] is not to suggest that the owner is obligated
to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish
a vessel and appurtances reasonably fit for their intended use." Id. at 550. See also
Italia1 5 Societa per Azioni di Navigazioni v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., supra note 13.
Libelant argued that the dangerous sling load was unseaworthy equipment,
and that Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirming iner. 205 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1953) (shipowner liable for defective equipment brought aboard by the
stevedore), was equally applicable to defective equipment fashioned aboard. Ferrante,
331 F.2d at 576. Characterizing the sling load as a defective piece of equipment
seems artificial; rather, the hazard seems to be a momentary step in a continuous
operation, to which no liability attaches. Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919,
922 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum).
Compare Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336
F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964) ; Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d
752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962) ; Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of
Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
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the Ferrante court preferred a broad expansion of the unseaworthiness
doctrine into the area of negligence.
In taking this step the court relied in part on Knox v. United States
Lines Co., 16 which involved longshoremen unloading rolls of burlap in the
ship's hold. By removing rolls from the center of the stowage while
leaving those on either side in place, the longshoremen created a V-shaped
depression and libelant, standing at the bottom of the V-shaped area, was
injured by a roll negligently dislodged from above. The court in Knox
held that although the longshoreman's negligence could not be imputed to
the shipowner, the case presented a factual issue as to whether an unseaworthy condition had been created.1 7 On remand it was found that no
8
unseaworthiness existed, although the longshoremen had been negligent,'
9
and the decision was upheld on a second appeal.
Finding no distinction between negligent breakdown of stowage, as in
Knox, and negligent use of equipment, as in Ferrante, the present court
interpreted Knox as indicating that "a stevedore's negligent or unsafe use
of a ship's seaworthy equipment makes the ship unseaworthy." 20 While
the court's analogy of breakdown to use seems valid, Knox did not state
that all negligence constitutes unseaworthiness as, indeed, the remand and
second appeal make clear. Rather, it only held that some instances of
negligence may createunseaworthiness. The distinction is between a negligently created condition which causes injury sometime after it comes into
being-where prior acts have created a tangible defect making an appurtenance of the ship unfit for its intended service-and a negligent act
which causes injury almost instantaneously-where nothing is defective
until the accident occurs, if at all. 21 For example, a rope weakened by
use is unseaworthy if the condition exists for a time before the accident,
but a longshoreman's negligently overstraining and breaking a previously
sound rope in a single act does not constitute unseaworthinessY 2 Unseaworthiness must be a condition in that it must have duration and must exist
16294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961), on remand, 201 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
aff'd, 320 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1963).
17294 F2d at 357-59.
18 201 F. Supp. at 133.
1' 320 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1963).
20
Ferrante, 331 F.2d at 577.
21
Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Rawson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202, 205 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Titus v. The Santorini, 258
F.2d 352, 354-55 (9th Cir. 1958); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922 (2d
Cir. 1956) ; see Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 843 (1961); Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961); cf. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336
(1955). But cf. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
22
Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., supra note 21, at 205 (dictum). Compare
Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
840 (1962), with Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). Of course
if the rope was intermittently and gradually weakened, a jury question would be
presented as to whether it was sufficiently weakened to be unseaworthy before the
accident occurred. See Grillea v. United States, supra.
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Knox v. United States Lines Co. is

entirely consistent with this view, since the circuit court's remand for a
factual determination whether unseaworthiness existed certainly contemplated that the trier of fact could find the ship seaworthy. Apparently
the only question on remand was whether the V-shaped depression constituted an unseaworthy condition. 24 Both courts in Knox seem to have
assumed that the negligent act of removing the last roll which caused the
stowage to collapse, not being a condition, could not constitute unseaworthiness. 25 The Ferrante court disregards this distinction, and in so
doing rejects both Knox and the line of cases holding that a longshoreman's
negligence does not without more constitute unseaworthiness. 2
For
example, in Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co.,2 7 involving a boom that
buckled when the stevedore crew subjected it to an unusual and dangerous
strain, the Second Circuit held that the trial court was justified in dismissing the complaint because the boom had been sound until the accident
occurred, and the sole cause of the accident was the negligent act of the
longshoremen. Since the Third Circuit had approved the Puddu decision
in the second Knox appeal, 28 this court's failure to distinguish between an
act and a condition, in effect, overrules Knox.
In the companion case decided by the Third Circuit, Thompson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., the jury was permitted to find unseaworthiness.
However, it appears that this issue never should have gone to the jury,
since the negligence, continuing until the accident, directly caused the
injury without creating an intervening condition, so that there could not be
unseaworthiness. 29 Even in Ferrante, it could be argued that the negligence ended with the placing of the load in the sling and sufficient time
23

Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964); Rawson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202, 205 (9th Cir. 1962); Titus v. The Santorini, 258
F.2d 352, 354-55 (9th Cir. 1958); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922 (2d
Cir. 1956); see Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 843 (1961); Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961). But cf. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539 (1960).
24 See 320 F.2d at 249; 201 F. Supp. at 132. The Ferrante opinion reads Scott v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964), a case almost identical with Knox
(involving bales of piece goods, rather than burlap), as construing "Knox as holding
that a longshoreman's negligent method of discharging cargo makes the ship unseaworthy." Ferrante,331 F.2d at 577. Actually, Scott construed Knox as holding that
a jury could find unseaworthiness on the facts. Since Scott reached the same conclusion, it is to that extent in conflict with the Ferrante rule, which takes the unseaworthiness issue away from the trier of fact.
25320 F.2d at 249; 201 F. Supp. at 132.
26 See Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 935 (1964); Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962); Billeci v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1962) ; Arena v. Lukenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 895 (1960); Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Peck, 269 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1959);
Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
27303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962).
28 320 F.2d at 250.
29 Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964).
But see
Huff v. Matson Nay. Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964); Blassingill v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964).
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elapsed before the actual hoisting of the sling to present a factual issue
whether a tangible defect existed such as to constitute unseaworthiness. 30
However, in Thompson the negligence continued until the accident occurred, since the longshoremen were still engaged in the loading practice
at least until the cars were set in motion. At this point the accident was
already in progress, the railroad cars being like a falling object which has
not yet struck. On these facts there existed no tangible defect which could
31
be plausibly described as rendering the ship unfit for its intended service.
The Thompson court relied in part upon Robillard v. A. L. Burbank
& Co.,3 2 in which the stevedore crew began unloading deck-stowed lumber
from the middle of the deck, passing sling loads over large piles of loose
lumber stowed nearer the rail. A load struck one of these piles, disarranging it. Shortly thereafter the pile was struck again and some
lumber fell, injuring plaintiff on the pier. The Thompson opinion cites
the case as holding that the unsafe method of unloading rendered the
equipment unseaworthy,33 although no defect in the gear existed. Actually,
Robillard involved an unseaworthy cargo configuration created by stevedore
negligence,3 4 and the court there seems to have interpreted the hazard as
such, referring to it as "the dangerous condition of the deck load .

. . .,

In such cases liability depends upon the presence of the dangerous condition; there is no suggestion that use of an unsafe method of loading should
be viewed as constituting unseaworthiness in itself. Apparently no case
prior to Thompson reaches that result with the possible exception of
Strika v. NetherlandsMinistry of Traffic,36 and the current vitality of that
case is questionable.3 7 While one statement by the Supreme Court in
Morales v. City of Galveston3 8 appears to support the Third Circuit's view,
the question whether a method can amount to unseaworthiness seems unrelated to the issues litigated in Morales, and the language used there is
39
open to other interpretations which do not support this court's holding.
30 See note 15 upra.
31 This is the standard set down by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). See note 14 supra.
32186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
33 Thompson, 331 F.2d at 660.
34 See also Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964); Knox v.
United States Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961), on remand, 201 F. Supp. 131
(E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1963); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
35 186 F. Supp. at 196.
36 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950). But one case subsequent to Thompson so holds.
See Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964).
37 See Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 935 (1964); Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F2d 752 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962).
38 370 U.S. 165, 170 (1962) (dictum).
39 The Court in Morales referred to an unsafe loading method as one of several
circumstances from which unseaworthiness "might arise." Ibid. This probably means
only that a method can create an unseaworthy condition, since it is not plausible that
the Court considered or intended to decide the question of whether a loading method
can in itself constitute unseaworthiness in the entirely different factual context of
that case.
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Although the Third Circuit attempted to support its holdings on the
rationale of earlier decisions, it seems clear that the present cases represent
a far-reaching innovation. Thus the soundness of their result must depend
upon policy grounds justifying this extension of the unseaworthiness
doctrine.
The presence of such grounds is by no means clear.40 Not only are
longshoremen covered by a generous and comprehensive workmen's compensation statute,4 ' but they have the benefit of an ordinary negligence
action against the shipowner, as well as the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
The net return to the longshoreman under the unseaworthiness doctrine
may frequently be less than the statutory compensation or exceed it by
only a modest amount, since fifty percent or more of the recovery may be
consumed by legal fees and other litigation costs. 43 Balanced against this
comparatively small increase in actual protection is a relatively heavy additional burden on the shipping industry. Even if it can be argued that
the various remedies already available do not adequately protect the longshoreman, congressional amendment of the compensation statute seems
preferable to an anomalous expansion of the unseaworthiness doctrine, since
the overhead expense of protecting these plaintiffs via compensation is
quite small in comparison to the substantial cost of litigating unseaworthiness cases. Furthermore, a policy decision to impose an additional burden
on the shipping industry involves a judgment as to its economic consequences, which Congress is better equipped to make.4
These considerations are not foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
expression of a policy of providing broad protection for injured longshoremen. 45 The Court made clear that this policy should be effectuated
within a set of doctrinal limitations which, while imposing certain burdens
on the shipowner, prevent his liability from being all-inclusive. 46 The
40 See generally BAER, ADmnALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 91-99 (1963) ;
Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1147-52 (1963) ; Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the
Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNFLL L.Q. 381 (1954); Comment, Expanding
the Warranty of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare of Maritime Disaster, 9 Viii. L.
REv. 422 (1964).
41

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424-46
(1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (Supp. V, 1964).
42
See, e.g., Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (1963).
43 See Shields & Byrne, supra note 40, at 1147.
44 Shields and Byrne urged that expansion of the unseaworthiness doctrine has
had a serious economic impact on American shipping, contributing substantially to
the decline of that industry. Id. at 1148-52. Evaluation of this argument involves
economic analysis on a broad scale.
45 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) ; Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
46 See note 14 supra. It is significant that in Morales v. City of Galveston, 370
U.S. 165 (1962), both the majority and the dissent refused to countenance the dissent
below, 291 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1961), which would have granted recovery on a
theory that the mere presence of poisonous fumes constituted unseaworthiness, although
they were very suddenly introduced into the hold without negligence of the shipowner
or longshoremen, and without any defect in the ship's gear. Both the majority and
the dissent focused on the ship's equipment and disagreed chiefly as to whether
absence of a forced ventilation system in the hold constituted unseaworthiness.
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Supreme Court has not been inconsistent in so limiting the doctrine;
to argue from the fact that humanitarian considerations justify imposing
on shipowners the burden of the presently limited unseaworthiness doctrine to the proposition that this policy justifies imposing any burden,
no matter how severe or how unrelated to a breach of duty by the shipowner, is a reductio ad absurdum. In light of the burdens which would be
placed on the shipping industry, as well as the lack of an affirmative showing that the present remedies are inadequate, it seems unnecessary to
distort the unseaworthiness doctrine by extending it into an area divorced
from the basis of its historic application, the shipowner's duty to maintain
his ship in a condition reasonably fit for its intended service.

TRUSTS-TAX ON TRUST INCOME
RESIDENCE HLD CONSTITUTIONAL

BY STATE OF BENEFICIARY'S

California assessed an income tax on the accumulated income of a
nonresident trust. Since the trust did not pay the taxes, pursuant to a
provision of the California Tax Code 1 the tax was collected from the resident beneficiary upon distribution of the accumulated income.2 The California Supreme Court, relying on the beneficiary's residence in the state,
held that collection of the tax did not violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.3 McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d
412, 37 Cal. Rptr. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1964), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 85 Sup. Ct. 278 (1964).
The due process clause prohibits state taxation of nonresidents except
where the state has "sufficient contacts" with them and through these
contacts has furnished benefits for which it can ask a return.4 The sufficiency of contacts is measured by their quantity and by the types of activities they engender in the taxing state. 5 In particular a court measuring
a taxing statute against the due process clause looks for some act or event
through which the nonresident has utilized the privileges of the forum
1 Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 659, § 1, at 2389 (now CAL. Rxv. & TAX CODE § 17745).
2 The case rested on the taxpayer's role as beneficiary, but he was also one of
three trustees, and the court stated that this connection could have provided an independent basis for taxation. Instant case at 421, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
3 See generally Sabine, Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Power To Tax,
12 HASTINGS L.J. 23 (1960).
4
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37 (1920) ; see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5
E.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960) ("The test is simply
the nature and extent of the activities . . ."). Compare id. at 207 (Florida use
tax upheld on orders solicited by a nonresident corporation through its resident
wholesalers), with Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (delivery to
customers within Maryland held insufficient activity to require the company to be
responsible for collecting state use tax).
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state. 6 Furthermore, when the tax is on income, the general rule is that the
activities must relate to the productiofi of that income.7
The court's conclusion in the present case that the state's role as
8
residence of the beneficiary gave it jurisdiction to tax the trust is difficult
to justify by traditional standards. Two Supreme Court cases have
sketched the line between permissible and unconstitutional taxes. In
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,9 a franchise tax measured by
gross receipts was held invalid as applied to reinsurance contracts entered
into outside the state, even though all the companies involved were licensed
to do business in the state and the insured parties were residents. The
court stated: "[A] 11 that appellant did in effecting the reinsurance was done
without the state and for its transaction no privilege or license by California was needful." 10 This case was distinguished in Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co.," which expressed a seemingly more liberal view of jurisdiction.
The court there upheld a tax on dividends declared outside the state on
the ground that "the incidence of the tax as well as its measure is tied to
," 12 These
the earnings which . . . Wisconsin has made possible ....
cases employ a standard which would deny state jurisdiction to tax in the
present case. As the trust itself engages in no activities within the state
and the residence of the beneficiary has nothing to do with the production
13
of income, there seems to be no basis for imposition of an income tax.
The California Supreme Court suggested that, even though the resident beneficiary was the sole contact, he served as a conductor through
which California furnished benefits to the trust and thereby gained juris-

6 See Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938). In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949), the Court upheld an ad valorem tax on a nonresident.
The Court stated that "so far as due process is concerned the only question is whether
the tax in practical opration has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection
conferred or afforded by the taxing state." Id. at 174.
7 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
464-65 (1959) ("the taxes imposed are levied only on that portion of the taxpayer's
net income which arises from its activities within the taxing state").
8
Instant case at 419, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
9 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
10Id. at

82.

11311 U.S. 435 (1940).
2
1 Id. at 446.
13 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In an action to determine the
rights to property which was held in trust in another state, the United States Supreme
Court denied state in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee because it
found that minimal contacts did not exist. Although the settlor and the majority
of beneficiaries were residents, the Court noted that the trustee had no office in the
state and transacted no business there. It apparently considered that communication
was not per se transaction of business. It is safe to conclude that the state in that
situation could not have imposed an income tax on the nonresident trustee. The
state in the instant case, as the residence of the beneficiary, has even fewer contacts
with the trust than the state had with the trustee in Hanson. Any analogy to be drawn
from that case would support a limitation on the state's jurisdiction to tax.
The analysis in the text as to the beneficiary is applicable as well to the trustee.
However, it is likely that the trustee's state of residence could impose an income tax
on him based upon a proportion, depending on the number of trustees, of trust income.
Cf. Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 498 (1947).
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diction to tax.' 4 The court pointed out that the trust instrument had a
provision prohibiting alienation of the equitable interest, and the state's
courts would be available to enforce this provision. 15 However, the
no-alienation provision could be enforced at the trust situs as well, and it
probably would be enforced there as a matter of convenience to the
trustees. 16 Therefore, as a practical matter this benefit is minimal. The
court also argued that the beneficiary "could enlist the aid of California
courts to enforce his equitable rights or redress trustee misconduct." 17
While this facility would be an additional benefit to the trust if the California judgment were enforceable against the nonresident trustees,18 the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla 19 casts
considerable doubt on the validity of a California ruling under such circumstances. Furthermore, neither the enforcement of the no-alienation
provision nor the enforcement of equitable rights is part of the routine
business of the trust. Although the Supreme Court has held that the
availability of privileges, rather than their exercise, determines benefits,20
it would seem that before privileges can be considered benefits they should
be practical and efficacious as well as merely available. This reasoning is
particularly cogent when the contacts are minimal and are due entirely to
the acts of the beneficiary rather than to any voluntary act by the trust
itself. Therefore, the court's asserted ground does not seem to raise the
state's exercise of the taxing power over the due process hurdle.2 '
While the court stated that the tax was on the trust and calculated
the beneficiary's tax liability on that basis, there are indications both in
the court's opinion and in the relevant statute that the tax could have been
interpreted as falling on the beneficiary.2 The tax board itself claimed that
14

Instant case at 419, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 643.

15 Ibid.
16 The trust situs and the remaining two trustees were all located in Missouri.
Control over the res in Missouri would effectively limit the beneficiary's power to
alienate his equitable interest. "The court having jurisdiction of the res, whether
real or personal property, has jurisdiction to determine conflicting rights and claims
in and to the trust property." 1 NOSSAMAN, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION
§ 34.07 (2d ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted) ; accord, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
17 Instant case at 419, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
Is The California Supreme Court cited cases which it felt would support California jurisdiction; however, they are all distinguishable from the present case.
McElroy v. McElroy, 32 Cal. 2d 828, 198 P.2d 683 (1948) (the trustees appeared
personally); Estate of Knox, 52 Cal. App. 2d 338, 126 P.2d 108 (1942) (trustee
appeared voluntarily through his attorney, and presented his accounts for settlement).
19 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Court stated that in order to sustain jurisdiction
"it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. The Court found
nothing comparable to the solicitation in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957).
20 Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 495 (1947). See generally Culp,
Selected Problems in Multistate Taxation, 44 IowA L. REv. 280 (1959).
21
This analysis is applicable to the trustee. See note 13 supra.
= The court said: "The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary is constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection with, and protection afforded to,
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this was a new and distinct tax on the beneficiary, for which he became
liable upon distribution of accumulated income only if the trust paid no
California income tax.P
If this tax were treated as falling on the beneficiary, the focus of the
constitutional inquiry would shift. Residence per se is sufficient to satisfy
the contacts and benefits requirement,24 but due process requires the state
to consider the funds actually made available to the taxpayer for his use
during the taxable period.2 5 It is well settled that a state can tax a resident beneficiary upon his receipt of current trust income. 26 It is also clear
that a state can impose a property tax on a resident beneficiary of a trust
27
if it isolates the value of the equitable interest and taxes only that interest.
Therefore, a year-by-year tax on the beneficiary of a discretionary trust
would not appear to be objectionable when the beneficiary's interest is
indefeasible. Availability would present no problem because the trustees
could provide the necessary tax funds without harming a third party's
future interest. In addition the beneficiary himself would have more money
available because of the financial cushion provided by the trust funds.
However, in the present case the beneficiary held a defeasible interest
plaintiff as such beneficiary." Instant case at 419, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 643. In addition
the court said: "California could constitutionally tax plaintiff as the resident beneficiary upon the accumulated income when it was distributed to him." Id. at 421,
37 Cal. Rptr. at 645. Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 659, § 1, at 2389 (now CAL. RE:V. & TAx
CoDE § 17745), is titled "income taxable to beneficiaries," and states that "such income
shall be taxable to the beneficiaries when distributable to them .

.

.

."

However,

the court seems to have concluded that the tax would have been invalid if it had been
imposed on the beneficiary. The court stated that income accumulations were added
to principal and "once the income has been entombed as principal within the trust,
we cannot later resurrect it as income." Id. at 417, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 641. A corollary
of the court's statement seems to be that California could not impose an income tax
on the distribution of principal. 2 NosSAMAN, op. cit. supranote 16, § 50.07. The federal
constitution does not seem to compel such a rule. In some situations the federal Internal
Revenue Code provides for a tax on the beneficiary in the year in which accumulated
income is distributed to him and calculates the tax rate as though the income had
been received by him in the year in which it was earned. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 666. This provision prevents the shifting of income from an individual to one or
more trusts in order to pay a lower tax rate. The state's problem is more serious
because it has no jurisdiction over the nonresident trust, and therefore the result of
the court's position would be not simply a lower tax rate but no income tax at all.
See notes 7-21 supra and accompanying text.
23 Instant case at 417, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 641; Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-16, 30
Cal. Rptr. 922 (1963). The tax board contended that accumulated income was taxable
as income
to the beneficiary in the single year in which it was distributed.
24
E.g., Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932).
25
2

1d. at 280-81.
6 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938) ; Maguire v. Trefry, 253

U.S. 12 (1920). The trust paid income taxes to Missouri for the years in question,
but double taxation was not a problem, because California allows a taxpayer a full
credit for all taxes paid to another state. Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 659, § 1, at 2386-87
(now2 7 CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §§ 18001-05).
1n Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929), Virginia
attempted to tax the entire corpus of a nonresident trust because of its contact with
the resident beneficiary. The Supreme Court held that the tax violated due process,
but stated that the power of a state to tax the equitable interest of a beneficiary was
not presented. In Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 A.2d 444 (1941), aff'd
per curiam, 312 U.S. 649 (1941), a state property tax on the beneficiary's equitable
life interest in a trust, prorated according to her age, was held valid. Cf. Graves v.
Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942) (resident donee taxed on testamentary power of
appointment of intangibles held by a nonresident trust).
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which he could not alienate.28 Either the beneficiary's death prior to distribution or trust losses through unpropitious investments could have
deprived him or his estate of eventually receiving the accumulated income.
Therefore, if an income tax had been imposed yearly on undistributed trust
income, the availability requirement of due process would not be satisfied.2
However, in the present case the beneficiary was not required to pay
the tax until distribution of the accumulated income.30 Since the tax was
imposed only when his interest was secured and the funds were available,
the constitutional problem did not arise. It is desirable that a state be able
to impose an income tax on the trust's distribution of accumulated income;
otherwise a resident beneficiary who received annual distributions of current income would be taxed, while a resident beneficiary who received
periodic distributions of accumulated income would escape tax liability.3 '
This inequity would be intensified because settlors could shop for a jurisdiction in which there was no state income tax and thereby avoid taxation
of either the trust or the beneficiary.
It can be argued that if the state can impose a yearly income tax on
the beneficiary when his interest is indefeasible,3 2 it should be able instead
to tax the trust which is producing the income. The relationship between
2 8

Instant case at 415, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 639.

29The doctrine of constructive receipt might provide an alternative ground for

a tax on the beneficiary in the circumstances of the instant case. Control is the
primary element of constructive receipt-which means, in this case, that the accumulated income of the discretionary trust must be available to be drawn at any time at
the beneficiary's demand. See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) ; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-2 (1957); Finnegan, Constructive Receipt of Income, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON
FEn. TAx 367 (1964). Compare Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945) (undistributed trust income which was distributable
upon request of the beneficiary was held taxable to him), with Funk v. Commissioner,
185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950) (court held no constructive receipt where taxpayer had
sole discretion to pay trust income to herself in accordance with "need"). The trust
instrument in the instant case provided for distribution to the beneficiary "as may
be necessary or advisable to assist [him] . . . in business, professionally or otherwise." Instant case at 415, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 639. In the instant case the beneficiary
was also one of three trustees. The others were his brother, who was beneficiary
of a similar discretionary trust, and a corporate trustee. The brother's trust had
the same three trustees. By agreeing to act in concert with regard to each trust as
the beneficiary of that trust might request, the brothers could each gain effective
control over his own trust See Spies v. United States, 180 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1950)
(children of settlor who were both trustees and beneficiaries of a discretionary trust
were held taxable for trust income). Therefore, it can be argued that accumulated
trust income is current income to the beneficiary in the year it was earned. However,
there is no indication that the brothers did agree to permit each beneficiary to control
his own trust, and the possibility that this might occur may be insufficient in the light
of the limitations on distribution in the trust instrument to constitute constructive
receipt
30
Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 659, § 1, at 2389 (now CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 17745),
instant case at 417, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The present statute recognizes that the
trust would have a reason for not paying the yearly tax if the beneficiary has only
a contingent interest. In such a situation the income is taxable to the beneficiary
when distributed or distributable to him. In view of the decision in the instant case,
it is not clear whether this would be a tax on the beneficiary or a tax on the trust
collected from the beneficiary.
31 The beneficiary would have to pay a tax on income earned in the year of
distribution, but not on income accumulated in previous years. See generally Traynor,
State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 Iow-A L. Rav. 268 (1937).
32 See notes 24-27 supra and text accompanying notes 24-28.
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the beneficiary who is sure to receive the money eventually and the trust
which is merely holding it for him is such that there would be no injustice
in treating this contact as sufficient for state taxing power over the trust.
This argument is even stronger when, as in the present case, the state
imposes the tax when the accumulated income is distributed. The state
even collects the tax from the beneficiary, so the practical effect is exactly
the same whether the state calls it a tax on the trust or one on the
beneficiary.
However, according to the generally accepted notions of jurisdiction,
whether the state calls this a tax on the beneficiary or one on the trust may
be crucial. While equality of result provides a reasonable ground for extension of jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has, so far,
refused to use it to supplement the traditional concepts. In Miller Bros. v.
Maryland,3 3 the state attempted to collect a use tax from a nonresident
company on out-of-state sales to its residents. The Court held that some
advertising and delivery to customers within the state were insufficient
contacts and activities to bring the nonresident within the taxing jurisdiction of the state. There was no doubt that the use tax could have been
collected from the residents, so that all the state was attempting was to tax
the same transaction in one way rather than another. 34 This case indicates.
that a yearly tax on the undistributed income of a trust could not be imposed on the trust itself, even if it could be imposed upon the beneficiary.
This analysis leaves open the possibility that the contact between the
state and the trust is sufficient for the tax to be imposed upon the trust and
collected from the beneficiary when he actually receives the accumulated
income. However, the additional act of the trust, the mailing of the
money, would generally not be sufficient in itself to bring the trust within
the jurisdiction' of the state. 35 Even when this act is added to the only
other contact, the presence of the beneficiary in the state, there does not
seem to be an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Therefore, the California
Supreme Court seems at least to have stretched the traditional standards of
due process. Since the state can accomplish the same goals within the
traditional limits, by a tax on the beneficiary, the court's introduction of
further complications into an already confused area seems unjustified.
The implications of the United States Supreme Court's dismissal
of the appeal are unclear. 8 On the one hand, the Court may simply have
S 347 U. S. 340 (1954).
34 The contact requirements for imposing a tax upon a nonresident, as in the
present case, should be at least as great as the requirements for using the nonresident
as a collector, as in Miller Bros. Cf. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212
(1960) (Florida statute upheld-the added burden of acting as the state's tax collector
was not considered significant); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 33, at 347
(suggesting that the burden of collecting the tax could be imposed upon the nonresident if there was an adequate jurisdictional basis).
35 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1957).
It was held that the state
did not have jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee simply because he had remitted
the trust income to the resident settlor.
36 It is interesting to speculate on the influence that the prestige of Mr. Chief
justice Traynor, a recognized expert in this area, may have had on the Supreme
Court's decision to dismiss, even though he did not write the opinion.
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concluded that the tax was in fact on the beneficiary. Such a conclusion
would not be inconsistent with the above analysis. On the other hand, the
Court may have concluded that the tax was clearly constitutional even if
levied on the trust. If so the Court seems to have departed from its traditional analysis. If this departure is limited to those situations where the
tax is collected only after the income is distributed to the in-state beneficiary, so that the practical effects of the tax are absolutely no different
from the effects of a tax on the beneficiary himself, then the result seems
reasonable as an exception to general jurisdictional requirements. However, the ambiguity resulting from use of the dismissal procedure leaves the
door open to future courts construing the action as a complete repudiation
of the traditional analysis in favor of a case-by-case determination based on
a "reasonable and just" standard, or as evidence of a willingness on the
part of the Supreme Court to find even the most insubstantial contacts
sufficient for jurisdiction to tax.

